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NOTES
THE MISSOURI RULE ON THE VALIDITY OF THE
ORAL PROMISE OF ONE CO-SURETY TO
INDEMNIFY ANOTHER
Following an early Supreme Court case, it has constantly been
held in Missouri that the oral promise of a co-surety to save another
harmless on default of the principal is a promise to answer for the
debt or default of a third person and hence unenforceable under the
fifth section of the Statute of Frauds. This view has been strictly
adhered to although the prevailing law in the United States has been
to the contrary.
The leading Missouri case is Bissig v. Britton,1 which was de-
cided in 1875 by Justice Wagner after some hesitation and little ex-
amination of the law. The facts were, briefly, these: The defendant,
as surety, signed a replevin bond executed by one John Wisner. In
order to make it good, he requested the plaintiff to sign it also, prom-
ising him immunity from any loss arising therefrom. The plaintiff
relied upon the promise of the defendant and signed the bond, acting
solely upon that consideration and agreement. Wisner, then, replev-
ined certain goods from a fourth party, but after execution had been
levied, retained the goods.
He refused to return the property and the plaintiff was sued upon
the bond and judgment rendered. He then brought suit against the
defendant upon his parol promise and the defendant pleaded the fifth
section of the Statute of Frauds.
The Justice stated in his opinion that "there is some plasuibility
in the argument, that where a request is made by one person to an-
other, to sign an instrument as surety for the benefit of a third party,
and at the same time the person agrees to indemnify and save the
surety harmless, and the surety becomes bound with that understand-
ing, that it is an original promise founded upon a sufficient consid-
eration." But after such an excellent statement of the law, he delves
into the musty depths of the English law to draw forth the conclusion
that where the plaintiff is a surety there is an implied liability of the
third party (the principal) to reimburse him for any damages sus-
tained by reason thereof. The promise of the defendant to save him
harmless is therefore collateral to the third party's liability and for
that reason it is a promise to answer for the debt or default of a third
party and under the operation of the Statute of Frauds.
He cites Winckworth v. Mills,' in which the plaintiff was the in-
1. 59 Mo. 204.
2. 2 Esp. N. P. 483.
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dorsee of a note payable to the defendant. The defendant at maturity
requested the plaintiff to collect the note from the principal, which
the plaintiff did at great expense to himself, and then sued the de-
fendant on his promise of indemnity. The defendant's promise was
held to be collateral and hence he was not liable. The promise is
more clearly collateral in this case than was the promise in Bissig v.
Britton, for here the defendant literally says, "If you can't collect
from the principal, I will pay you."
But this case was overruled in Thomas v. Cook,8 which states
the law as it is most generally in America today. It was, however,
overturned in Green v. Gresswell.4 Green v. Gresswell has ever since
been the law of England, but United States law is contrary.
The overwhelming weight of authority is to the effect that a
promise by a surety to indemnify a co-surety, or an agreement that
the co-surety shall be responsible only for a certain proportion of any
loss sustained, is not a promise to answer for the debt or default of
another and need therefore not be in writing.5
One of the early American cases to lay the foundation for the
national law on this subject is Sanders v. Gillespie.6 The facts in
the case, while not identical to those in Bissig v. Britton, are so sim-
ilar in relation as to leave little room for differentiation. Here the
plaintiff was the first indorser on a note and the defendant was the
second. The defendant promised, but not in writing, to deliver certain
goods to the plaintiff when he paid the note at maturity on .default of
the principal, but after the plaintiff had suffered a loss by reason of
his making good the note, the defendant pleaded the fifth section of
the Statute of Frauds.
The Justice stated in his opinion that the promise of the de-
fendant was not collateral, but original. For, he points out, the plain-
tiff, in consideration of the defendant's promise, assumed as an addi-
tional obligation, the share for which the defendant would be liable
in an action for contribution, a more onerous duty, which could be
measured pecuniarily. The defendant received as his consideration
from the plaintiff, the release from liability to the obligee of the note.
The decision was in direct antithesis to the earlier English
cases, and, if we may believe Justice Wagner, not in accordance to
the English law as it is today. But it is logically apparent that the
conclusion of the New York justice can be reached without the cir-
3. 8 Barn. and Cr. 728.
4. 10 Ad. and El. 453.
5. 1 A. L. R. 388.
6. 59 N. Y. 250 (1874).
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cumlocutory deductions of the Justice Wagner. Is it not unreasonable
to trace the defendant's liability by first deducing that the primary
obligation is upon the principal to indemnify the plaintiff for his loss,
thus making the defendant's liability secondary to the principal's and
collateral? Surely, if the defendant had such a relation in mind the
argument would be just. But when the defendant makes his oral
promise, he says "I will pay you, if you make good the amount of
this note." He knows that the plaintiff will not conceive of his being
secondarily liable, for the defendant's promise is made in the event
that the possibility of the principal's solvency is past. He therefore
says he will be primarily liable if the plaintiff assumes a given respon-
sibility.
The leading Massachusetts case in point is Weeks v. Parsons,1
In this case the directors of a corporation, who indorsed corporate
notes, agreed that their liability was to be joint, not several. Of course,
this meant that on consideration of their mutual signatures, they
mutually agreed to save each other harmless from other than his pro
rata liability. It was held to be an original promise and not a col-
lateral undertaking.
Then in Potter v. Brown,s an additional support for the Ameri-
can doctrine is found. One of a number of sureties agreed to become
the co-signor of a note in consideration of the signature of another.
The Statute of Frauds did not rule here. And in Cortelyou v. Hoag-
land,' the directors of a corporation induced another to sign as surety
on consideration of their saving him harmless. In both cases the law
is well stated to be that such obligation is an original undertaking and
not collateral.
Missouri has not, however, gone out of line in cases of contracts
to indemnify other than those of co-sureties. In Rubey Trust Co.
v. Weidner, 10 it was rightly held that the promise by one to a bank
to stand personally liable for checks drawn by him as treasurer of
an organization, although in parol, was binding as an original under-
taking.
And in Boone County Lumber Co. v. Niedermeyer,11 the defend-
ant promised to pay the plaintiff a bill owed him by another, if he
would furnish the third party with goods, and it was held also to be
an original undertaking.
Although in these cases the agreements of the defendants to save
7, 176 Mass. 570 (1900).
8. 85 Mich. 274 (1877).
9. 40 N. J. Eq. 1.
10. 174 Mo. App. 692.
11. 174 Mo. App. 180 (1915)
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the plaintiff harmless on default of a third party are apparently no
more original undertakings than the parol promise of a co-surety to
indemnify, the courts have arrived at a correct decision, while in the
others they have failed.
Despite the contrariety of the prevailing American ruel, Mis-
souri has constantly adhered to the original construction of the law as
set out by Justice Wagner in Bissig v. Britton. It has been affirmed
in one case,"2 approved in another," and followed in two more.14 Had
the courts followed the construction which the honorable justice said
is "plausible," Missouri would today be in accordance with the law
of the nation. SYLVAN AGATSTEIN.
12. 142 Mo. 301.
13. 1 Mo. App. 376.
14. 25 Mo. App. 574; 87 Mo. App. 528.
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